Islamophobia
in Australia - IV
(2014-2021)

Executive Summary
by
Assoc. Prof. Derya Iner

Charles Sturt University

ISLAMOPHOBIA REGISTER AUSTRALIA

ISRA

CENTRE FOR RELIGION, ETHICS AND SOCIETY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The fourth Islamophobia in Australia report has been compiled from incidents reported to the Islamophobia Register Australia (the Register) since its inception in September 2014 until December 2021. A total of 930 verified incidents (515 offline and 415 online) were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The research data is based on reported incidents rather than random sampling, which constrains the ability to make generalisations across Australia. Nevertheless, the reported incidents over the past eight years provide a critical and valuable source of data in terms of:

1. Unpacking the characteristics of Islamophobia in the Australian context.

2. Revealing trends over time of the behaviours that characterise Islamophobia.

3. Shedding light on the unique features of each reporting period.

4. Providing real life experiences through respondent comments to provide context for quantitative results.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ISLAMOPHOBIC INCIDENTS (2014-2021)

The 2014-15 period saw Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) threats overseas including its emerging offshoots in Western countries including Australia. The 2016-17 period marked a resurgence of far-right parties and their anti-mosque and anti-halal online campaigns and nationwide rallies, while ISIS terrorist attacks were still prevalent and being weaponised to heighten anti-Muslim hate in Australia. The 2018-19 period marked growing far-right activism and the Christchurch terror attacks in New Zealand, while 2020-21 was characterised as the COVID-19 period, with its associated lockdowns and restrictions. With these characteristics in mind, the nature and trends of Islamophobia in Australia have varied between 2014 and 2021. The following findings are derived from the 930 incidents (515 offline and 415 online) reported to the Register from 2014-2021.

78%

78% of the victims were women while 70% of the perpetrators were men.

Offline

Reporters, Victims, Perpetrators

Witness reporting dropped by half (from 47% to 24%) since the inception of the Register (2014-15) until the start of the COVID-19 era (2020-21). Analysis of reporter types indicated that neither multiple types of harassment nor physical attacks mobilised third parties to report incidents. Witness reporting was high for incidents of graffiti and vandalism while hate speech and/or threats were mostly reported by victims (59%).

Most victims were women (78%) and most perpetrators were men (70%). Two in three women were harassed by male perpetrators. Distinctive gender dynamics were observed in the execution of Islamophobic incidents by female perpetrators, who usually harassed female victims (88%) and rarely harassed male victims (12%). Female

perpetrators were usually in safe settings like official buildings, workplaces and schools. In most cases, the harassment was verbal (80%), while no Muslim men faced physical harassment by a female perpetrator. Risk was always mitigated by female perpetrators at the time of the attack by selecting vulnerable victims such as unaccompanied women and children (Case 52-21), harassing victims from a vehicle (Case 39-21) or while being accompanied by a group (Case 70-21) or a male (Case 39-21).

The perpetrator's gender had minimal effect on the victim's gender, with 75% of male and 88% of female perpetrators abusing a female victim. Death threats were almost equally distributed with 12% of males and 10% of females receiving them from a male perpetrator. Male perpetrators were dominant in committing physical attacks and property damage as well as in expressing the most intense level of hate, expressed as a desire to kill Muslims.

Gender dynamics affected the type of incidents and insults that male and female victims faced. Muslim women experienced more verbal intimidation, while Muslim men experienced greater levels of discrimination.

Although both genders experienced the same level of physical violence (8%), the way in which the abuse was articulated or expressed was construed according to the victim's gender. For instance, violence was associated with Muslim men, while religious insults and misogynist foul language were directed at women. Harassing hijabi women with misogynist comments for submitting to a so-called misogynist religious dogma (Case 15-20) is paradoxical.

Vulnerable victims were the most convenient targets of Islamophobia and were exposed to more physical attacks. Women and children continued to bear the brunt of Islamophobia where two in ten children and three in ten vulnerable victims (other than children) were exposed to a physical attack. Half the female victims were alone while one in five women were with children. Women with a male companion were rarely abused (4%) while the abuse of children with a male was almost non-existent (2%).

The most intense hate level (i.e. wanting to kill) was also mostly directed at women alone or those with a child. Women in religious attire experienced a higher proportion of physical attacks than men in religious attire, yet no difference emerged over the type of verbal insult experienced between females and males wearing religious attire.

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Age

Older age groups tended to harass younger age groups while young perpetrators tended to harass victims who were their own age. Victims were concentrated in the

8 in 10 individuals from the 40-49 year group targeted victims younger than themselves.

20-29 and 30-39 year age groups while perpetrators were concentrated in the 40+ age bracket. Eight in ten perpetrators from the 40-49 year group and half of the 50+ cohort targeted victims younger than themselves. Young perpetrators like the 10-19 year age group (67%) and 20-29 year age group (45%) mitigated the risk by attacking people their own age. This dynamic changed when the perpetrators were in a group, such as multiple teenagers abusing an adult (Case 70-21 and Case 74-21)

Incidents

Three-quarters of reported offline incidents (76%) were directed at individuals and this proportion has not changed over time. Generic cases, which are not directed at individuals, such as graffiti and stickers, continuously reached numerous viewers, especially on public transport.

Verbal intimidation was the most usual form of abuse (45%), followed by graffiti and vandalism (12%) and discrimination by authorities in official buildings, workplaces, schools (10%) written material (9%, n=44), physical assault (8%, n=41), multiple incident types in one case (8%, n=42), non-verbal intimidation (6%, n=42) and other (2%, n=8).

The perpetrators' hate speech content was coded at the time of the incidents. Attacking religion/religious appearance was the most frequent insult (64%) followed by foul language (38%) and xenophobic comments (37%). Apart from the type of insult, the level of hate was also used to assess the intensity. Abuse starts from a feeling of hostility and gradually intensifies to feelings of contempt, dehumanisation, disgust and a desire to harm. Results indicate that verbal intimidation was more apparent with feelings of hostility than it was with a desire to kill, while physical and property attacks were more closely associated with a desire to kill.

Locations

Most perpetrators (85%) were seemingly Anglo/European while most victims were from Middle Eastern or Arab backgrounds (47%), followed by the Subcontinent (18%) and then Asia-Pacific (13%) and Anglo/European converts to Islam (13%). Islamophobic incidents continue to increase, reaching up to 50% in multiculturally diverse suburbs, where ethno-religious diversity is expected to be part of daily life. No significant difference was observed in the nature and type of incidents between multicultural and non-multicultural suburbs. Physical attacks were slightly higher in multicultural suburbs. Other expressions of hate rhetoric were similar, although in multicultural areas, a presumption that Muslims kill was double that reported in non-multicultural areas (10% compared to 5%, respectively).

More than half of all incidents (57%) occurred in guarded areas in 2014-2021. It is concerning that incidents in guarded areas reached 75% in 2018-19 and 70% in 2020-21. The increasing rate of incidents in guarded areas indicates the lack of deterrent effect of security personnel and surveillance cameras in reducing Islamophobic incidents and the increasing insecurity for Muslims everywhere.

Physical attacks were less likely at school or university and more likely in leisure places. Being in a guarded or unguarded setting had little effect on whether an attack was verbal or physical in nature. A greater proportion of property damage occurred in guarded areas such as mosques, indicating that although safety and protection of

64%
Attacking religion/religious appearance was the most frequent insult (64%).

religious institutions is a high priority, guarding these places with security guards and surveillance cameras should be supported by informed prevention strategies and custom-made prevention measures for more effective results.

While women with hijab must be hypervigilant everywhere irrespective of whether the setting is guarded/unguarded or multiculturally diverse or not, Muslim men also need to be hypervigilant while attending mosques as they became more visible and a potential target of harassment (Case 36-21) and physical attack (Case 41-21).

The most intense level of hate (i.e., wanting to kill) was expressed at similar proportions (25%) in guarded and unguarded places indicating that expressions of violent sentiment were not deterred by the presence of guards and surveillance cameras.

Third Parties

The most common hotspots remained as shopping centres (20%), followed by construction sites and streets (14%), public transport (11%), car parks (11%) and schools or universities (11%). Whilst this demonstrates that most incidents occurred in a public setting, in almost three quarters (72%) of cases the incident only involved the perpetrator and victim (given they were unaccompanied). Third parties were more likely to be present in cases of physical attack than in cases of verbal abuse and non-verbal intimidation.

In highly crowded places like shopping centres, such incidents may be deemed unimportant or not noticed by third parties. Therefore, it is essential for victims to alert others in the vicinity about the harassment and thereby potentially inspire bystanders to assist and defuse the incident.

57%

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The involvement of a formal third party (i.e., security and store managers) had limited impact on defusing any conflict as only two-thirds supported the victim while one-third remained silent or supported the perpetrator. Even a gentle warning by authorities might discourage attacks in stores and shops where Islamophobic incidents are prevalent.

Emotional Impact

Being the most convenient and frequent target of Islamophobia, hijabi Muslim women displayed hypervigilance in their daily routines such as keeping the car doors and windows locked when a stranger approached (Case 28-20). Both male (46%) and female (58%) reporters expressed one or multiple emotional impacts (compared to 54% male and 42% female who did not express an emotional impact). Male and female victims expressed slightly different emotional impacts. Men tended to express sadness and disappointment while women expressed fright and anger.

Negative emotional impact was more prevalent in younger rather than older age groups, who were 16% less likely to express a negative emotion. Cases involving children were always reported by proxies and witnesses who expressed disappointment (67%). For women with children, sadness and worry (50%), fear or fright (47%) and disappointment (34%) were the most prevalent emotions. While mothers tried to minimise the impact of the incident by remaining calm, some expressed they were affected inwardly. In one case a mother described how she remained "cool for the children," but felt actually "shocked" inside (Case 28-20). When her children were called "Taliban" by an Anglo couple, another mother felt that she could only ignore it in order to limit the emotional

impact on her children, but felt helpless because she could defend neither herself nor her children (Case 69-21).

Behavioural responses by victims were categorised as avoidance, an urge to respond and physical expressions of emotions like crying and shaking. Avoidance included ignoring the perpetrator and walking away. In most cases, this was a coping mechanism for women to avoid escalation of the perpetrator's hate and harassment. Accordingly, in two-thirds of cases (66%), the victim avoided the incident, while 22% felt the urge to respond. Those showing avoidance behaviour were more expressive of the emotional impact than those who did not. In most cases, avoidance behaviour was associated with fear and fright, humiliation and disappointment.

An urge to respond was also an outcome of the incident's emotional impact and mostly occurred in cases of physical rather than non-physical attacks. Further, those who expressed negative emotions were more likely to feel an urge to respond than those who did not express a negative emotion.

Two types of insults were significantly related to the expression of emotional impact. Reporters were more likely to express an emotional impact if they were a target of xenophobic comments and and if they were subject to comments associated with terrorism.

Long-term impact

Those who expressed an emotional impact were significantly more likely to indicate a long-term impact than those who did not. Whether the incident was verbal or physical had no bearing on suffering from long term impacts, with approximately one-quarter of respondents suffering a long-term impact from verbal (24%) and physical attacks (25%). This indicates the devastating impact that emotional violence has on victims because of hate speech. This is best expressed in cases of Muslim staff members being associated with terrorism regardless of their work relationship with their supervisors (Case 29-20) and colleagues (Case 5-20). Blatant associations of religion with terrorism in political, legal and public discourse arenas burdened Muslims with having to constantly differentiate themselves from Al Qaida and ISIS terrorists at work (Case 29-20, Case 5-20) and school (Case 42-21) and resulted in them suffering from short and long-term impacts.

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Online Incidents

For 2014-2021, 415 online verified cases were reported to the Register by third parties. Facebook was the most reported platform for Islamophobic incidents, constituting three-quarters of all reported incidents. Apart from being a popular online platform for hate actors, there is also an organic overlap between the popularity of Facebook among Australian adults and the adult age concentration for victims, perpetrators and reporters of the Register. The Registration's operation through Facebook might have also contributed to it.

Of the online perpetrators, one-third (36%) were associated with far-right groups and/or ideology. Social media provided a fertile ground for hate groups through the free exchange of divisive and hateful viewpoints, which are largely unregulated and unmonitored. Far-right alternative media and social media outlets reframe, recontextualise and reproduce news stories by carefully selecting information from non-mainstream sources to justify their ideological agenda. Accordingly, news items appearing to be neutral are recrafted as partisan and combined with disinformation and propaganda for the public to consume.

In the absence of trigger events like ISIS terrorism and the Christchurch terror attacks, anti-Muslim hate actors created agendas online by artificially connecting the dominant discussions of the day to Muslims. For instance, the killing of George Floyd by a police officer in the US (Case 11-20), the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban regime and the coronavirus outbreak in Australia (Case 14-20) were used as excuses to demonise Muslims as being dangerous, selfish and in search of favouritism by playing the victim. Furthermore, the hate actors circulated specially selected (Case 10-20) and fake news (Case 7-20) from around the world to problematise Muslims and keep anti-Muslim hate fresh. Beyond sharing disproportionate and misleading content fuelling anti-Muslim hate, such outlets solidified their agenda by engaging local and global followers in heated anti-Muslim discussions. The Facebook page of former Senator Fraser Anning (Case 82-21) and the Jihadwatch Twitter account of Robert Spencer (Case 81-21), a renowned American Islamophobe, posted hateful content about Australian Muslims and engaged thousands to express anti-Muslim sentiments, which sometimes reached extreme levels in times of trigger events or fervent discussions.

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Demographics

Muslim women were the most active reporters of online Islamophobia and reported more online cases (61%) than men (39%). Three quarters (75%) of reporters in the period of 2014-21 were Muslim. The ratio of non-Muslim reporters dropped significantly (from 35% in 2014-15 to 2% in 2020-21). Activating male reporters and other online viewers of any kind is essential to show solidarity and combat Islamophobia as part of a communal/societal effort.

75%

MUSLIM INCIDENT REPORTERS (ONLINE)

Although 83% of the reported incidents were generic hate posts, they triggered conversations in the comments section, some of which led to personal attacks when the perpetrators were questioned or challenged by third persons in the conversation threads.

Content

Significant differences were observed in relation to the insult content and whether it was made offline or online. The presumption that Muslims kill was used approximately four times more online (30% vs 8%) and an association with terrorism was around twice as likely online (44% vs 21%), while the proportion of xenophobic insults was greater offline (56% compared to 37% online). In contrast, those insulting religion and religious appearance, which dominated offline and online hate rhetoric, was similar (67% and 65%) as was the use of foul language (34% and 36%). Furthermore, the gendered hate rhetoric observed in the offline world was also reflected in the online result, as men were associated with terrorism and women were insulted for their religious appearance.

Within the hierarchy of emotional intensity leading to extremism, the proportion of those "wanting to kill" was at the most intense level of hate in online compared to offline interactions (35% compared to 10%). In contrast, dehumanising people offline was three times higher than in online platforms (21% compared to 7% online). Except for wanting to kill, all other categories of hate were displayed in physical settings and arguably laid the foundation of extreme hate expressed on social media platforms. A significantly greater number of mass killing/civil war comments online suggests the extension of offline hate to extreme levels on social media.

## Emotional Response and Impact

In total (including offline and online cases), six in ten people expressed one or more emotional impacts. The proportion of those expressing an emotional impact was higher in physical (offline) cases (70%) than online cases (47%). Witnessing generic hate posts online, which mostly included expressions of intense hate by individuals in the comments thread, was emotionally impactful for half the reporters.

Furthermore, fear/fright was equally felt by online and offline reporters (34% online, 37% offline). This result suggests that online hate cases were perceived as 'real' as offline cases. Feelings of sadness (56%), anger (61%) and humiliation (22%) were more prevalent online while disappointment (42%) was more prevalent offline.

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ONLINE ISLAMOPHOBIA

OFFLINE ISLAMOPHOBIA

30%	Presumption that Muslims kills	8%
44%	Association with terrorism	21%
37%	Xenophobic	56%
65%	Insulting religious appearance	67%
36%	Foul language	34%
35%	Wanting to kill	10%
7%	Dehumanising people	21%
47%	Emotional impact	70%

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COVID-19 PERIOD (2020-21)

Islamophobia in Australia during the COVID period has similarities with Islamophobia patterns around the same time in other Western countries. Under the unique COVID-19 circumstances, reporting dropped significantly (40 physical and 50 online incidents). The challenges of the pandemic, which were felt starkly by minorities and socio-economically disadvantaged communities, seemed to shift the focus of hate away from Islam. Increasing anti-Asian racism during the pandemic temporarily released Muslims as the main target for racism. Lockdowns and distancing rules also limited the conditions for physical harassment. Nevertheless, Muslims were scapegoated for breaching rules, spreading COVID-19 and rejecting vaccination. They felt discriminated due to what has been widely criticised as being double standards in law enforcement during the lockdowns.

The COVID-19 period contributed to a reversion to Islamophobic stigmatisations like the perception of Muslims being backward and dangerous. The media portraying Muslims as flouting pandemic restrictions gave Islamophobes an excuse to harass them for not properly following the restrictions (Case 60-21) or blame them for bringing the virus to Australia from overseas (Case 14-20).

Witness reporting increased from 35% to 53% between 2014-21. However, this was not due to bystander reporting but due to the reporting of news and incidents that were circulated among community members via WhatsApp and other group messages. Most of such reports were underlining incidents of discrimination, over-policing and double standards during the lockdowns especially in Sydney and Melbourne, where the majority of Muslims live in Australia (Case 53-21a, b, c, d).

Generic incidents were more prevalent during the COVID era (33% compared to 15% in 2018-19) while personal incidents were directed at collective entities like Islamic schools, organisations and mosques, blaming Muslims for violating restrictions and

causing new clusters and outbreaks. For instance, a school was targeted for spreading the virus after a teacher tested positive (Case 61-21). Around the same time, some media accused Muslims of spreading COVID-19 during Eid celebrations (Cases 54-21 and 80-21), portraying Muslims as a new threat at a time of heightened anxiety.

The characteristics of COVID-19 were reflected in the hotspots. Due to lockdowns and pandemic restrictions like physical distancing, incidents on public transport (from 11% to 4%), official buildings (from 8% to 4%,), schools and universities (from 11% to 8%) dropped significantly, while not a single case was reported in leisure centres. In contrast, incidents around homes and neighbourhoods slightly increased (from 4% to 8%, compared to the ratios borrowed from 2018-19)

There was a significant jump in expressions of emotional impact offline and online during the COVID 19 period. The highest emotional impact was expressed in 2020 while expressions of emotional impact in response to online cases was higher than in physical cases. It is possible that social, economic and educational challenges faced by socio-economically struggling minorities during the COVID-19 period aggravated the impact of Islamophobia at this time. The question in the reporting tool asking the reporter's emotional state, which was added to the reporting tool as an optional question in 2018, might have contributed to this increase in 2020 as well. During 2014-21, a steady increase was observed for both genders in feeling humiliated because of Islamophobic attacks.

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Trends of Islamophobia between 2014-2021

Victims

The rates of anti-Muslim incidents targeting women remained constantly high. Abuse of unaccompanied children increased steadily until 2018-19. This number dropped during the COVID-19 when children were less likely to be alone outdoors to be alone and consequently less likely to be the target of Islamophobic abuse.

Social relationship

The incidents indicating an existing relationship between the perpetrator and victim (9% overall in 2014-21) increased significantly to 21% in 2018-19 and 24% in 2020-21. This was associated with increased reporting of discrimination at work and school settings in the last two years following the start of victim advocacy services by the Register.

Reporting to police

The incidence of reporting to police decreased for offline and online incidents between 2014 and 2021. The reporting of property damage (i.e., predominantly attacks on mosques) to police increased almost four-fold in the year of the Christchurch terror attacks.

Hotspots

Incidents occurring in guarded places continued to increase, reaching 75% in 2018-19 and 70% in 2020-21. In contrast to the drop in physical attacks in the aftermath of the Christchurch terror attacks, property damage (predominantly attacks on mosques) increased from 14% in 2014-15 to 35% in 2020-21.

Content of insults

In 2016-17, when ISIS attacks were topical, an association between Muslims and terrorism was low (15%) whereas religious appearance was high (75%). It is possible, due to the conflation of Muslims and Islam with terrorism in the media and in public discourse, religious appearance and terrorism might be synonymous from a perpetrator's view. Also, because male victims were associated with terrorism and female victims were harassed by insulting their religious appearance and religion, dominance of religious appearance in the hate rhetoric is expected since more than two-thirds of the victims were women.

A presumption that Muslims kill people, which portrays Muslims as an inherent threat to safety, was steady (4%-6%), except for a sharp increase in 2018-19 (15%), when Muslims were the victims of far-right extremism in Christchurch.

Death threats

Statements about mass killing /civil war, karma/deserving to be killed (35%) were prevalent in the aftermath of the Christchurch attacks, while references to cutting of the throat (by calling it halal slaughtering) and stoning were prevalent amid anti-halal campaigns and descriptions of ISIS atrocities between 2014 and 2017.

More than half the online incidents demonstrated an intensity of hate rhetoric (52%) that was at the highest level (i.e., wanting to kill) when ISIS attacks and anti-Muslim campaigns by far-right groups were gaining momentum in the aftermath of the Christchurch attacks.

Portraying Muslims as a threat to one's life was a consistent form of hate rhetoric. Insulting religious appearance and religion was another dominant theme, which was replaced with the association of Muslims with terrorism in 2018-19. Muslims were associated with terrorism (53%) when 51 Muslims were massacred in shooting attacks at two mosques by a far-right terrorist in Christchurch.

Further, in 2016-17, when ISIS attacks and recruitment were most topical, a Muslim's presence and religious appearance was the most prevalent subject of attack (86%). During the COVID-19 period, religious appearance (65%) and presuming Muslims kill (58%) were the top two forms of online anti-Muslim hate rhetoric. The consistent trend of insulting religious appearance and presuming that Muslims kill reflects the stigmatisation of Muslims and Islam since the War on Terror, and their continual depiction as the enemy.

53%

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THE WAY FORWARD

- Islamophobia is a social cohesion problem and requires a whole of society approach to encourage and maintain an environment that has zero tolerance for the harassment of any individual.

- Despite the prevalence of Islamophobic incidents in the most frequented public places, people witnessing incidents often do not appear to be intervening to support victims. Bystanders should be activated to apply social pressure to brazen perpetrators to act appropriately. Signage aimed at repelling hate and encouraging reports of hate crimes in places such as public transport may assist with this. Men should also be encouraged to report both offline and online incidents as they are underrepresented in reporting.

- Combatting Islamophobia as a whole society effort, is an effective means to improve trust and solidarity between members of Islamic communities and mainstream society (bridging capital). It also builds community resilience to social discord that seek to undermine social cohesion.

- Likewise, the similar types and numbers of Islamophobic incidents in multicultural and non-multicultural suburbs demonstrate that multicultural settings do not prevent Islamophobia. Without directly addressing Islamophobia as a problem of social cohesion, the problem will persist.

- Developing cross-cultural solidarity among communities and especially among women is essential to repel the misogynistic face of anti-Muslim racism and the public abuse of Muslims.

- It was mostly men from Anglo/European backgrounds and from older cohorts that harassed mostly younger hijabi women from non-White ethnic backgrounds. Gender, race, age and status (as supervisors, principals, employers etc) can operate as enablers of Islamophobia. Removal of entrenched habits may take time but is possible if:

  - Members of society take action to dismantle gender, race and age enablers in reproducing racism and Islamophobia.

  - Workplaces, schools and official institutions develop strategies that go beyond recognising and addressing discrimination, and proactively aim to reduce Islamophobia through developing policies and procedures that reduce the likelihood of inappropriate behaviours arising in the first place.

  - Vulnerable victims are self-empowered to resist being convenient targets for perpetrators and self-assured about their value to minimise the impact in case of facing Islamophobia.

- The increasing number of Islamophobic incidents in guarded places indicates the limited ability of security personnel and surveillance cameras to contain the problem. This leads to increased insecurity for Muslims everywhere, including in guarded places. It is essential to educate security personnel and store managers about how to handle Islamophobic incidents.

- Increasing generic security measures to guarded premises has limited effectiveness since physical and property attacks (mostly at mosques) occurred in guarded places and no difference was observed between physical and verbal attacks in guarded and unguarded places. Every type of guarded place and hotspot has unique features and circumstances. Custom-made security and prevention strategies should be developed by engaging participants, especially targets of Islamophobia.

- Within the emotional intensity scale (hostility, contempt, dehumanisation, disgust and a desire to harm/kill), the most intense hate level was significantly higher online than offline (35% compared to 10%). All other categories of hate were blatantly displayed in physical settings. The fluctuating levels of hate in physical circumstances are often extended to extreme levels in online discussions. The connection between the two and transformation of offline hate to online in extreme levels requires taking a holistic approach to tackling Islamophobia, without a rigid distinction between offline and online Islamophobia.

- The insult rhetoric of perpetrators illustrates that Islamophobia has become heavily normalised by associating Muslims and Islam with violence. Official presentations of terrorism motive within the framework of Religious Motivated Violent Extremism need to be reframed to avoid centring religion as the cause of violence or threat, overtime giving space for Muslim individuals and communities to show the diversity and depth of their stories and identities.

- The expression of emotional impact was higher in physical (offline) cases (70%), but also occurs frequently in online cases (47%). Fear/fright was felt by online and offline reporters (34% online, 37% offline). Online hate cases were perceived by Muslim online users as being as real and frightening as offline hate cases. Technology companies should take greater consideration of the impact of emotional violence on recipients of extreme hate and act on this by reviewing and raising their community standards.

- Islamophobia (expressed whether physically or verbally) hurts men and women in offline and online contexts. Emotional violence left lasting impacts on vulnerable victims, especially hijabi women with children. Researching the impacts of Islamophobia on men and women is an investment in the well-being of target communities now and into the future.

- The comprehensive analysis of 930 reported cases over eight years has provided numerous hypotheses to test on a nationwide scale. The results will be instrumental in combatting Islamophobia at a national level through the development and implementation of informed strategies.